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ABSTRACT 
 Sustainment costs are the largest portion of total ownership cost (TOC) for ships 
across the Department of the Navy. Driving down these costs through innovative 
approaches both in sustainment and acquisition will free up vital resources. This is 
important to enable reprogramming to support the Navy’s shipbuilding goal. With budget 
constraints, efficiencies must be realized to deliver the battle force required to maintain 
our naval advantage. This thesis assessed Government Accountability Office findings for 
Navy ships to determine how improved portfolio management in accordance with Section 
809 panel recommendations will improve accuracy of sustainment costs that result in 
reduction of planned TOC. We found that primary contributing factors of increased TOC 
are concurrency in technology development, design, and construction, and a lack of 
advocacy for TOC considerations early in the acquisition process. Accordingly, though 
Navy ships will always have concurrency as a system of systems, establishing a 
sustainment program baseline of equal standing with the acquisition program baseline 
would positively impact TOC through equivalent governance for acquisition and 
sustainment functions and would ensure sustainment had equal advocacy with 
acquisition. Improved flexibility and autonomy for reprogramming would help apply 
funds directly to the Navy’s sustainment challenges. When combined, Navy ships can 
positively influence TOC. 
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Recently, there has been greater emphasis placed on total ownership costs (TOC) 
of systems and ships. While a large amount of attention and emphasis remains on the 
procurement and acquisition of systems and ships, the Navy is beginning to also look at 
how to reduce total ownership costs. This specifically applies to surface ships that continue 
to see service life extensions to meet missions and to require new capabilities they were 
not originally designed to support. 
While it is acknowledged that operations and sustainment (O&S) account for a 
large majority of the TOC of a ship, decisions that can impact the sustainment costs over a 
ship’s life cycle are often made extremely early in the acquisition process. The disconnect 
between when these decisions are made and when the impacts are felt makes it even more 
difficult to use TOC as a decisions-making driver. Because sustainment is such a large part 
of TOC, an understanding of the challenges faced in the longest part of a ship’s life cycle 
is needed. In addition, the relationship between decisions in the earlier phases of the 
acquisitions process and their impact to sustainment needs to better be understood.  
Navy ship sustainment requirements have grown significantly over the past decade 
because of a variety of factors—from issues with system reliability to extended duration of 
ship availabilities to increased operating tempo that leads to increased wear and tear on 
ships. This increased requirement has grown to over $25B annually over the past three 
fiscal years and the trend continues to increase with projections growing to $40B annually, 




Figure 1. Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2020-FY2049). Source: 
CNO (2019). 
The current state drives program decisions on life cycle sustainment early in the 
acquisition process. Congressional constraints on unit cost drive program office behavior 
and, as a result, when ship construction costs exceed estimates, long term sustainment costs 
become marginalized in the interest of future milestone decision approval to continue the 
program.  
During acquisition, Navy programs are measured at various points called Gate 
reviews and, more formally, at traditional DOD acquisition milestones (e.g., Milestones A, 
B, C). This alignment of Navy review is shown in Figure 2 (Office of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 2019). At formal milestones, the primary measure of program viability is the 
Program Acquisition Cost that is often driven by unit cost. Programs are subject to Nunn-
McCurdy legislation and a breech may lead to program cancelation. As a result, ensuring 
unit cost is as low as possible is a significant goal for the program manager. 
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Figure 2. DON Requirements/Acquisition Two-Pass Seven-Gate 
Process with Development of a System Design Specification. 
Source: ASN (RD&A) (2019). 
Certainly, low acquisition cost is of importance to the taxpayer, as well; however, 
the average American would recognize that purchasing something at a lower cost may lead 
to higher operating and maintenance costs (due to lower quality) and that may drive them 
to spend for higher quality up-front to lower future long-term costs. That concept is one 
that Navy may not always be able to follow as acquisition unit cost goals and Nunn-
McCurdy restrictions influence program manager behaviors. 
Recognizing the issue around ballooning costs to operate and maintain ships and 
other DOD systems, Congress introduced legislation to formally assess acquisition. The 
FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established an Advisory Panel—
heretofore referred to as the Section 809 panel—charged with making recommendations to 
streamline and codify Acquisition Regulations. Additionally, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) is responsible for executing routine reviews and audits of 
government programs. In both 2018 and 2020, GAO analyzed Navy shipbuilding and 
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generated two reports that examined acquisition process, outcomes, and risks that aligned 
with our area of interest (Oakley, 2018 and Oakley, 2020) 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Navy sustainment costs continue to increase over the life cycle of ships (OPNAV 
N9, 2019). Disjointed acquisition management, focus on unit acquisition cost, and a lower 
emphasis on sustainment costs result in either the inability to identify long term 
sustainment issues, inadequate planning for sustainment requirements, or ill-informed 
decisions to be made. Sustainment accounts for 70% of the total ownership cost over 
surface ship life cycle (Section 809 Panel, 2019). 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of Program Life cycle Cost Average for MDAP 
Categories. Source: Section 809 Panel (2019). 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Our research aims to identify the main causes of inadequate sustainment planning 
and to determine how addressing them would reduce total ownership cost (TOC) over the 
life cycle of Navy ships. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions will help us to determine the reasons for increased 
sustainment cost as we seek to analyze the gaps and assess potential solutions. This is 
important because of increasing focus on controlling costs in the current climate where 
budgets will, at best, remain flat. As sustainment costs can represent up to 70% of the total 
life cycle cost of surface ships, we believe it to be an important area of focus.  
• How do the Section 809 panel and GAO recommendations regarding 
sustainment costs as part of TOC apply to Navy ship acquisition and 
support? 
• What are the primary contributing factors to increased sustainment costs 
for ships? 
• How can the Navy reduce or eliminate external influences? 
E. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
This section defines sustainment costs, as identified in acquisition, and identifies 
why reducing cost benefits the Navy. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) defines 
sustainment as the phase where planning occurs “to maximize readiness by delivering the 
best possible product support outcomes at the lowest Operating and Support (O&S) cost.” 
(DAU, 2020, chapter 4). Furthermore, it states that “programs that emphasize sustainment 
early in the system life cycle deliver designs with the highest likelihood of achieving 
operational performance requirements and reduced demand for sustainment.” (DAU, 2020, 
chapter 4). Our experience as program managers, primarily executing projects in the 
sustainment phase, drives us to wholeheartedly concur with the preceding statement, 
leading to our research. We understand there are not enough resources to fully support the 
current requirements and believe there are impactful actions that will provide benefit as the 
Navy changes acquisition. 
F. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY 
This research provides an analysis of recommendations made by the Section 809 
panel and GAO to determine the potential benefit regarding total ownership cost for Navy 
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ships. Data, findings, and recommendations from these sources will be analyzed and assess 
for their impacts and potential to affect TOC. Data and analysis for this research will result 
in suggested recommendations for improvement. 
G. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis determines the most impactful Section 809 and GAO recommendations 
as determined through careful analysis related to TOC of Navy ships. Additionally, 
external contributors to cost will be reviewed and recommendations provided as to the 
factors that, if eliminated or reduced, would provide additional benefit, and recommend 
areas of further research. 
H. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provided the background, research questions, and overall scope of this 
research. Chapter II provides a detailed overview of the references used in the analysis. 
Chapter III summarizes relevant data and provides detailed analysis. Chapter IV presents 
the findings of this research project, and Chapter V provides conclusions and recommended 
areas for further study.  
I. SUMMARY 
This section provided an overview of life cycle sustainment and the challenges 
facing the Navy related to total ownership costs. It also identified the problem statement 
and discusses the benefit of addressing these challenges. Lastly, it bounded the scope of 
research and presented the thesis statement. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been several recent efforts to better understand the acquisition and 
sustainment of Navy ships. To identify objective data, three independent analyses were 
selected—two from the GAO and one from the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and 
Codifying Acquisition Regulations commonly known as the Section 809 panel. 
In 2018, the GAO released a report, Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides 
Valuable Lessons for Future Investments, investigating surface ships procured within the 
last decade (Oakley, 2018). This report emphasized shipbuilding challenges including cost 
overruns, accumulation of risk, and performance prior to and immediately following 
delivery of the ships. Following the 2018 report, the Section 809 recommendations were 
released in 2019. The 2018 GAO report and the Section 809 panel results were published 
in the same timeframes, with the scope of the 809 Panel being significantly broader in its 
recommendations as it assessed acquisition reform across the DOD. While the panel did 
not focus solely on Navy ships, some of the recommendations stood out as being 
particularly impactful to TOC and sustainment of surface ships.  
Following these recommendations, the GAO also released a follow-on report in 
2020, Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Focus on Sustainment Early in the Acquisition 
Process Could Save Billions, this time with an emphasis on the whole ship life cycle and 
sustainment (Oakley, 2020). GAO openly acknowledged that greater attention and 
emphasis should be paid to TOC. The shift in focus by GAO is particularly noteworthy and 
helps us better understand some of the challenges and issues surrounding TOC 
considerations for surface ships. This literature review highlights the results in both GAO 
Reports, the Section 809 Panel, and a few other relevant literatures that cover the TOC, 
total life cycle costs, and sustainment specifically for Navy ships. 
A. NAVY SHIPBUILDING REPORT (GAO 2018) 
In 2018, the GAO released the Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides 
Valuable Lessons for Future Investments report (Oakley, 2018). This report examined 
multiple ship classes that were delivered in the ten years preceding the report. The report 
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details many of the areas where risk was being accumulated and eventually realized which 
then impacted cost, schedule, and performance of the in-service fleet after delivery. 
The report points out that first ship and follow-up ships are still more costly than 
anticipated, are delivered late, and are delivered with many deficiencies. It also identified 
some reasons for such situations. For example, the maturity of the technologies compared 
to design and construction heavily impacted the amount of uncertainty surrounding 
acquisition. Technology development, design and construction often occur concurrently. 
Particular emphasis was placed on accurately accounting for the uncertainty that this 
creates in the business case and cost estimates that support the shipbuilding acquisition 
programs. 
B. NAVY SHIPBUILDING REPORT (GAO 2020) 
The GAO released a follow-on report Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Focus on 
Sustainment Early in the Acquisition Process Could Save Billions in 2020 (Oakley, 2020). 
Interestingly, this report shifted focus to the impacts that acquisition decisions have on 
sustainment. This also aligned with increased focus from Congress on sustainment. The 
GAO again looked at ships delivered in the ten years prior to the release of the report, but 
also included two new acquisition programs not yet delivered at that time. The report 
acknowledges that the Navy struggles to sustain and maintain ships, and that often the 
resources and time required to meet capability requirements throughout the life cycle of a 
ship are significantly higher than expected. 
In this report, key decisions in the early acquisition phase and their impacts to 
sustainment are investigated. Some of the main findings were that sustainment was not 
adequately discussed or taken into consideration in early acquisition. This was found to be 
partly due to the lack of appropriate requirements and knowledge to help the Navy make 
informed acquisition decisions. Sustainment requirements are lacking and can lead to 
emphasis being placed in the wrong areas or using metrics that do not accurately reflect or 
predict the sustainability of a ship. The Navy has challenges across the board, from defining 
requirements, to understanding of impacts, to reporting and assessing key factors and true 
indicators of sustainment. 
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C. REPORT REGARDING ACQUISITION REGULATIONS (SECTION 809) 
The third piece of literature is the Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining 
and Codifying Acquisition Regulations. The fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized creation of this panel which will be referred to as 
the Section 809 panel in the remainder of this report. The Section 809 panel analyzed 
fourteen (14) areas of interest. Many of the areas have a degree of tangential connection to 
TOC; however, our research focus is limited to the data and analysis the panel presented 
in the portfolio management section of their report.  
Portfolio management is a relatively new concept to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and Department of the Navy (DON). In fact, in routine engagements, program 
management still dominates the language of military and civilian acquisition professionals. 
Portfolio management, in the context of project management, involves managing a 
collection of programs so that organizational goals are met. Ideally, this would ensure 
individual project goals are not in conflict with each other. In the DON, this is a challenge 
as the organizational structure is disjointed and decisions can be fragmented. As an 
example, many major Program Executive Offices (PEO) are split across acquisition and 
in-service codes. For example, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 21 has multiple 
Program Executive Offices within the organizational structure. Conceptually, NAVSEA 
21 would be responsible; however, in practice, Program Management Shop (PMS) 407 and 
443 handle acquisition and sustainment separately and, apart from Life Cycle Sustainment 
Plan (LCSP) requirements, there is no continuous accountability across the life cycle. With 
no one entity accountable for integrated results across both, decisions made in acquisition 
have the potential to negatively impact items such as cost or maintenance when the 
equipment is in-service may be made. 
Our review of the Section 809 panel report focuses on Recommendations 41 and 
42. The first, Recommendation 41, is to “Establish a sustainment program baseline, 
implement key enablers of sustainment, elevate sustainment to equal standing with 
development and procurement, and improve the defense materiel enterprise focus on 
weapon system readiness.” (Section 809 Panel, 2019, Vol 3, p. 50). This recommends a 
fundamental shift in defense acquisition planning, oversight, and control by introducing a 
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sustainment program baseline (SPB) with equal weight and standing to the acquisition 
program baseline (APB).  
The second, Recommendation 42, is as follows: “Reduce budgetary uncertainty, 
increase funding flexibility, and enhance the ability to effectively execute sustainment 
plans and address emergent sustainment requirements.” (Section 809 panel, 2019, Vol 3, 
p. 50). This recommendation considers the fact that sustainment costs “historically 
accounted for about 70 percent of total weapon system costs.” (Section 809 panel, 2019, 
Vol 3, p. 124). As individual programs sometimes exceed that figure, the panel 
recommends realignment of sustainment funds to investment accounts from the current 
annual methodology and suggests appropriation funding guidance is unclear leading to 
inaccuracies in life cycle cost estimates (LCCE). 
We also reviewed budgetary recommendations to determine other barriers to 
effective sustainment planning that increase total ownership cost.  
D. ADDITIONAL LITERATURE OF INTEREST 
Further review of previously published literature revealed a paper by Michael 
Boudreau and Brad Naegle, Reduction of Total ownership Cost, written in 2003. Although 
written more than a decade prior to the GAO reports or the Section 809 panel, many of the 
ideas and concepts in the paper similarly revolve around efforts that can reduce TOC. Of 
particular note is the way in which the authors define TOC, commentary on cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV), and what tools a program manager (PM) might use to 
encourage TOC reductions. 
The paper clearly recognizes that there is an inherent conflict associated with 
managing TOC and meeting acquisition cost, schedule, and performance expectations prior 
to operations and sustainment (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003). In addition, CAIV is only 
significantly applied during the acquisition phase prior to fielding of a system. While many 
of the specifics discussed involved individual weapons systems, the nature and struggles 
in managing TOC identified in the paper are still imminently applicable to the Navy, and 
shipbuilding even now. 
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) spend significant portions of their 
budget on sustainment activities. This O&S funding averages 70% (Section 809 Panel, 
2019); therefore, controlling costs here is extremely important. That said, the fact that total 
life cycle cost (TLCC) estimates are made years prior to many of these costs being realized 
drives the need for improved sustainment planning.  
Additionally, it may be true that the PM at program initiation when TLCCs are 
determined is usually different than the PM in the procurement and sustainment phases of 
the program when costs are incurred. In other cases, the sustainment program office is 
completely different that the acquisition program office as is the case with Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS). The organizational structure and assignments mean accountability is 
challenging to uphold. This challenge also highlights the importance of accurate planning 
and the need for acquisition decisions that drive down costs over the entire program life 
cycle and avoid the trap of minimizing initial acquisition costs to ensure program approval 
at the expense of the TLCC. Figure 4 provides averages for procurement, O&S, and other 
costs by MDAP categories across the DOD. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Program Life cycle Cost Average for MDAP 
Categories. Source: Section 809 Panel (2019). 
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Figure 4 identifies the percentage of cost across major categories of defense 
programs. These O&S costs are significant and may be funded by a variety of funding 
“types,” such as Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation (RDTE), and Other Procurement, Navy (OPN). This disparate source of 
funding leads to a lack of clarity and clear traceability of program costs. Additionally, there 
are various definitions of cost that sometimes conflate meaning and lead to entirely 
different assumptions or conclusions based on the point of view of the cognizant PM. The 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines program acquisition cost as “The estimated 
cost of development research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE), procurement, 
and system-specific military construction necessary to acquire the defense system” and 
describes life cycle cost as “research and development (R&D) costs, investment costs, 
operating and support costs, and disposal costs over the entire life cycle.” (DAU, Glossary, 
2021).  
This difference is extremely important because the program acquisition cost is 
included in the APB and is subject to Nunn-McCurdy Act while the life cycle cost is not 
subject to the Nunn-McCurdy Act. Figure 5 identifies the thresholds for significant and 
critical breach for both original and current program baselines (Schwartz & O’Connor, 
2016). Therefore, to avoid program cancelation due to a Nunn-McCurdy breach, cost per 
unit is strictly tracked and managed to during acquisition.  
 
Figure 5. Nunn-McCurdy Breach Thresholds. Source: Schwartz and 
O’Connor (2016). 
Unit costs on a life cycle basis are not subject to Nunn-McCurdy; therefore, 
tradeoffs can be made prior to acquisition that defer capabilities and costs into the 
sustainment phase of the acquisition life cycle. Additionally, systems can proceed through 
development that meet key performance parameters (KPP) and lower program acquisition 
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cost but are not the most cost-effective system over the life cycle. Lastly, systems may be 
selected that are, effectively, obsolete upon fielding leading the Fleet or sustainment 
program office to bear the brunt of funding replacements and/or upgrades in-service using 
O&M funding. 
A shift in cost to the Fleet is perhaps the most detrimental effect of poor sustainment 
planning. Not only does the Navy cost increase but Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
(OMN) funding must be diverted from Fleet operations and maintenance requirements to 
either field upgraded systems or procure additional spares that were not anticipated. As 
Fleet operating tempo increases, this not only threatens unit operating costs but may have 
a very real impact to mission effectiveness. 
The Navy also faces challenges with sustainment because of a lack of governance 
and equal standing with both development and procurement. Prior to full rate production 
(FRP), programs are governed by the APB. The APB is defined as “An agreement between 
the PM and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) that documents the program cost, 
schedule, and performance baselines, and is the fundamental binding agreement between 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the Component Acquisition Executive if 
applicable, the Program Executive Officer, and the PM.” (DAU, Glossary, 2021). The APB 
includes key performance parameters (KPP) and is the foundation for reporting program 
cost, schedule, and performance to the MDA. 
 While essential to acquisition execution and program viability, it is noted that the 
APB only applies “to less than one- third of the program’s life cycle costs” (Section 809 
panel, 2019, Vol 3, p. 103). Approximately two-thirds of life cycle costs (roughly the entire 
sustainment phase) are not centrally governed and are, in fact, executed by multiple entities 
that provide solutions in a singular fashion without overarching coordination. This lack of 
coordinated oversight of execution increases cost. 
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Figure 6. Sustainment Program Baseline in the Acquisition Cycle. 
Source: Section 809 Panel (2019). 
The Section 809 panel recommends establishment of a sustainment program 
baseline (SPB), as shown in Figure 6. The SPB concept is based on the acquisition program 
baseline that governs program execution prior to full rate production (FRP). It would drive 
a documented agreement between the PM and MDA who would transition from the service 
acquisition executive to the service sustainment executive. The PM would then be held 
accountable to sustainment milestones, thresholds and objectives, and costs in a similar 
fashion to review points (e.g., milestones and gate reviews) during ship acquisition. It is 
important to note that the PM would not receive all sustainment funding—for example, the 
Fleet would still directly receive operations and maintenance (O&M) funding—however, 
the PM would be responsible for aligning and balancing resources to achieve sustainment 
outcomes. 
The SPB has unique roles pre and post milestone C (MS-C). During acquisition, 
the SPB would start early at concept development and formalize the requirements 
generated as part of the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP). In the current process, the 
LCSP accounts for sustainment activities but does not necessarily budget for all of them. 
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The key to the Section 809 panel recommendation is the “budget and funding for all 
product support requirements and life cycle costs would be identified in the SPB” (Section 
809 panel, 2019, Vol 3, p. 108) and the “APB and SPB would be reviewed and approved 
at program acquisition milestones.” (Section 809 panel, 2019, Vol 3, p. 108). This key 
change ensures the LCSP is not simply a required document without budget and funding 
identified and agreed to at all milestones. It forces the milestone discussion to not strictly 
focus on the acquisition unit cost and current fielding schedule. 
In sustainment, the SPB takes on an even greater role. The governance provided by 
the SPB ensures clear PM authority and drives regular reporting. Specifically, the Section 
809 panel states that the PM is authorized to govern “product support requirements, 
funding, and performance of the program in the sustainment system.” (Section 809 panel, 
2019, Vol 3, p. 109). This authority enables the program to establish agreements with 
sustainment providers and the concept establishes reviews every two years through 
disposal. In effect, the SPB establishes regular decision points like those prior to milestone 
C to provide accountability and integrated decision making throughout the sustainment 
phase. The SPB concept strengthens the PMs position in integrating sustainment activities. 
In addition to Executive Branch changes, the 809 panel examined the complexity 
of product support funding, as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 shows the numerous determinations that must be made and the 
complexities that are introduced after MS-C. Product support requirements are contained 
in the LCSP. These requirements evolve and develop between program initiation and MS 
C. However, full funding for the program remains the same. Milestone reviews ensure 
maturity and identification of products to be supported over the life cycle, but the cost focus 
is on the unit cost being delivered. This is important both because program funding is not 
increased as the LCSP matures and because product support over the life cycle is funded 
via a wide mix of funding types and sources. This makes it a challenge for product support 
managers (PSM), let alone PMs to navigate. This, specifically, is the challenge that would 
be solved by the SPB concept and regular sustainment milestones mentioned previously. 
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Figure 7. Complexity of Product Support Strategy Funding. Source: 
Section 809 Panel (2019). 
As shown in Figure 8, the decision tree isn’t necessarily complex, but its rigidity 
impacts efficiency as discrete types of funding must be planned and budgeted for to best 
execute the sustainment strategy. Flexibility is key and an improved ability to reprogram 
funds without congressional approval would provide funding flexibility. Legislative 
oversight is important, as is accountability; however, portfolio managers could improve 
execution of sustainment with added flexibilities in the Federal Management Regulation 





Figure 8. Current Product Improvement Funding Policy. Source: 
Section 809 panel (2019). 
A simplified decision tree for sustainment funding would help to resolve confusion 
and consolidate the vast amount of sustainment accounts so they are adequately funded. 
When commercial off the shelf items (COTS) are available in the market, the panel 
recommends moving directly to procurement, even if the COTS solution requires 
modification. RDTE funds would only be used to develop a ground-up solution that needs 
to be developed because no market solution exists. This simplified flow for investments 
and expenses is depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Proposed Product Investment Decision Tree. Source: Section 
809 panel (2019). 
This approach would maximize RDTE and procurement appropriations and 
increase separation between those accounts and operations and maintenance accounts 
leaving the latter to better focus on maintenance, repair, and operations. Budget flexibility 
to accomplish this is required. First, increased RDTE and procurement thresholds must be 
authorized as well as an increase in the ability for movement of funds, or reprogramming, 
within accounts. The Section 809 panel recommends both an increase and the ability for 
below threshold reprogramming (BTR) to be delegated as far down as the PEO/PM level—
to the individuals with the greatest knowledge of the program to best apply resources and 
reduce approval time. This flow does not eliminate congressional notification but 
simplifies the authorities and improves response time, which is a concern as 
reprogramming tends to routinely occur late in the fiscal year. The proposed BTR authority 
flow driven by PEO/PM is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Current and Proposed Decision Authority Flowchart for BTR. 
Source: Section 809 panel (2019). 
Ultimately, for this to occur, legislative concurrence and action must occur. This 
must be followed by Executive Branch action, in response. The Section 809 panel 
recommends that FMR rules be modified by Congress to allow reprogramming at the 
portfolio level. Subsequently, the Navy must allow PMs to perform BTRs where equal 
offsets are identified within the same portfolio. These improvements would increase 
flexibility and drive down the number of decisions made simply to execute funding to meet 
benchmarks that are not necessarily in the best sustainment interests of the program. 
To summarize our analysis, the SPB provides the needed governance over life cycle 
decisions and helps to drive accountability regarding the balancing of requirements over 
the life cycle. It’s equivalence to the APB ensures a sustainment review of acquisition 
decisions and could provide a check on the lowest cost acquisition decision if legislation 
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also changes to incentivize life cycle cost over unit procurement cost. Additionally, budget 
flexibility granted via legislative and, subsequently, Executive Branch change is important 
to improve the ability for PMs to quickly adjust to the environment. 
In order to apply these recommendations and analyze their impact on Navy ships 
specifically, it is important to gain a better perspective on the issues with both acquisition 
and sustainment of the current Fleet. The following section attempts gain this perspective 
by examining the Navy Shipbuilding GAO reports from 2018 and 2020 (Oakley, 2018 and 
Oakley, 2020). 
Of the two GAO reports being examined, the 2018 report focused on shipbuilding 
and the 2020 report focused on sustainment. While the largest portion of costs are realized 
in the sustainment phase, it is worthwhile to analyze the shipbuilding process and its 
contribution to both TOC up to delivery as well as impacts to sustainment. 
The shipbuilding findings observed that ships cost more than estimated upon 
delivery and examined the causes for such overruns. This is true of first-in-class ships and 
follow-on ships. (See Figure 11 and Figure 12.) While it might be expected that first-in-
class ships would cost slightly more as extensive verification and validation testing of all 
integrated systems may be more risk on the first full delivery, it does not follow that many 
of the risks and issues would still be delivered with follow-on ships. For the 11 ship classes 
examined, the Navy paid over $11 billion more than budgeted upon delivery (Oakley, 
2018). This indicates a more systemic issue, as costs were not driven down with successive 




Figure 11. Cost Growth of First-in-Class. Source: Oakley (2018). 
 
Figure 12. Cost Growth of Follow-on Ships. Source: Oakley (2018). 
One of the causes for such cost increases was the concurrency of technology 
development, ship design, and ship construction phases—meaning technology was still 
maturing even as the ships were being designed and built (Oakley, 2018). This introduces 
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uncertainty and risk to the process. In addition, the report indicates unrealistic expectations 
and budgets built off such uncertainties also result in budgets and cost estimates that are 
much lower than needed. Additional analysis also saw the Navy taking on much of the cost 
risk during the ship construction phase. Figure 13 shows clearly how much overlap there 
is in between technology development, design, and construction during shipbuilding. 
Anywhere there is overlap in the phases, is an area of increasing risk. In Figure 13, it is 
also clearly shown that construction occurs even while the technology is still being 
matured. 
 
Figure 13. Technology Development and Production Concurrency. 
Source: Oakley (2018). 
While these are key causes for cost overruns for ships at delivery, there was one 
additional finding that had significant implications for sustainment. The Navy also appears 
to be accepting incomplete ships. Ships delivered with numerous deficiencies are difficult 
and costly to sustain. This is exacerbated by the reduction of test procedures, inspections, 
and test requirements often experienced as ships approach the obligation and work limiting 
date (OWLD) and budget and schedule pressures increase. 
It follows that the GAO also found the Navy lacking in our ability to assess 
sustainment cost growth and that many ships are delivered with degraded capabilities and 
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deficiencies. (See Figure 14). As long as the requirements are not there, ships will continue 
to be delivered with sustainment issues even as they officially meet the established 
operational availability threshold. 
 
Figure 14. Deficiencies upon Delivery. Source: Oakley (2018). 
Ultimately, these findings from the 2018 GAO Navy Shipbuilding Report focus 
upon delivery of ships. Whether it’s risk in the concurrency of technology development, 
design and construction, and production, the process of defining requirements tied to 
sustainment, or the deficiencies the Navy received along with the ship, all were apparent 
upon receipt. And similar to how the Acquisition Baseline covers only a third of the TOC 
of a ship or system, further insights are needed to delve into the life cycle sustainment 
impacts and issues that a class may experience across its service life.  
Two years after the initial GAO report, a follow-on report was released to do just 
that. The report, titled Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Focus on Sustainment Early in 
Acquisition Process Could Save Billions, delves deeper into the full sustainment costs and 
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how early acquisition decisions have impacted not just delivery, but costs across the entire 
life cycle (Oakley, 2020). 
This subsequent GAO report released in 2020 found that sustainment requirements 
and metrics established early in the acquisition process did not end up reflecting the state 
of the ships after delivery. Because operational availability was dependent only on the 
presence of category 4 casualty reports (CASREPS), many ships were meeting the defined 
operational requirement, when in fact they were not able to perform mission critical 
capabilities. Essentially, the requirements that acquisition managers are held to do not lead 
to optimal sustainment decisions.  
Other reasons for the cost growth and misalignment between estimated O&S costs 
and actual costs included lack of accounting for the sustainment risks, and lack of 
sustainment information used to inform acquisition decisions. The GAO 2020 report 
general found that there were not requirements, incentives, or general practices for 
sustainment considerations to influence the acquisition process (Oakley, 2020). And the 
main avenue available, the requirement development process, was not able to adequately 
capture the impacts of acquisitions decisions on operations and sustainment accounts.. 
Combined with the knowledge that the APB truly only accounts for a third of the costs 
across the life cycle of the ship but is a critical document that guides the acquisitions of 
ships, systemic cost growths and significant re-work in the operations and sustainment of 
our ships is not surprising. 
Essentially, the report found that sustainment considerations and how the Navy 
manages how assumptions, risks, and other acquisition decisions impact sustainment are 
underdeveloped. How they are captured, managed, and communicated as well as 
understanding how decisions early in the acquisition process impact sustainment, all are 
areas that require improvement to curb the growing costs, deficiencies upon delivery, and 
maintenance burdens being realized by the Fleet. As one footnote regarding the O&S cost 
estimates for a ship class compared to actuals states, “Due to Navy O&S budgeting and 
program processes, we could not calculate the total difference between these estimates and 
actual costs, and we were told by several Navy officials that such a comparison would be 
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impossible.” (Oakley, 2020, pp. 67). There are fundamental tools and processes lacking to 
be able to capture the data and build a full understanding of the cost growth. 
Additionally, GAO also found that product support managers (PSM) are not 
involved early enough in the shipbuilding process. It was only as recently as 2019 that 
PSMs should be appointed by Milestone B, which is still relatively late to affect 
sustainment requirements (Oakley, 2020). Finally, GAO acknowledged the tension 
between PSM and sustainment considerations and cost/schedule drivers in the acquisition 
process. Often the sustainment priorities are found to be at odds with the acquisition 
managers cost and schedule goals. The emphasis on cost and schedule in the acquisition 
process can be seen from the historical gate review process and the command structure 
within the DON where sustainment is subordinate to acquisition. Exacerbating the issue of 
sustainment is that the system inherently incentivizes only acquisition until delivery to the 
Fleet. Therefore, any sustainment improvements that would impact cost and schedule are 
deferred until after delivery so as not to impact the acquisition baseline. The result of the 
current structure, based on the GAO’s findings, are gross cost and capability impacts past-
delivery and throughout the life cycle of the ships. 
B. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF SECTION 809 AND GAO REPORTS 
In combination, the Section 809 Panel, the GAO 2018 report, and the GAO 2020 
reports all have similar messaging regarding TOC for ships and potential paths forward.  
The Section 809 panel report provides broad acquisition and sustainment reform 
recommendations that apply across the Department of Defense (DOD) that apply to 
Department of Navy, specifically, given the context of the GAO reports that focus on 
acquisition and sustainment challenges the Navy has faced with respect to shipbuilding. 
Though the Section 809 panel report is broad, the Navy can apply these changes (or should 
press the DOD to apply and codify recommendations in guidance to allow the Navy to 
leverage improvements that would result). The Navy should also provide codified guidance 
to empower program managers and integrate acquisition with sustainment. Establishing an 
SPB and regular sustainment milestones would help to improve Navy ship sustainment 
throughout their life cycle. 
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Whether it is DOD, DON, or Navy shipbuilding specifically, the data shows there 
are systemic issues influencing how the Navy manages TOC and the influence sustainment 
considerations have in the early acquisition process. Recommendations from all parties 
center around the dynamic between how pre-delivery decision affect post-delivery costs. 
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IV. FINDINGS / RESULTS 
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS 
The major behaviors in acquisition that lead to increased sustainment cost are 
programmatic focus on average unit procurement cost for program approval and proper 
sustainment cost planning for Navy ship acquisition. 
The main way to influence these behaviors is through the establishment of a 
Sustainment Program Baseline (SPB) that has equal standing with and accountability of 
the Acquisition Program Baseline. The SPB will help place sustainment and resulting total 
ownership cost on equal footing and standing with the Acquisition Program Baseline when 
it comes to MDAP program governance. Implementation of the sustainment role within the 
Navy should be done in a way that is organizationally equal to the role of acquisition. 
Without organizational equivalence, there is an inherent underemphasis on the SPB and its 
goals. It is not enough to establish a position, as the Navy has done. The Department of 
Defense has established an Undersecretary for Acquisition & Sustainment. This position is 
responsible for Acquisition and Sustainment equally, and names matter. The current 
structure where the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment reports to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition maintains a 
secondary, advisory nature of sustainment as related to acquisition. 
Sustainment is the largest component to TOC and programs measured by average 
unit procurement cost alone, while important, places the focus on procuring affordable 
units that are often not sustainable from a cost perspective over the ship life cycle. 
Acquisition decisions made solely by the APB drive the Navy to cut costs and make 
tradeoffs that negatively impact long-term O&S costs and defer logistics impacts to the 
warfighter once fielded. It is vitally important to deliver the warfighter the key performance 
parameters they desire; however, a product that delivers warfighting capability with 
increasing operating and maintenance costs becomes unaffordable, not solely from those 
direct costs but from the costs of incremental modernization performed to overcome 
obsolescence or other maintenance and logistics issues that cause pain for the warfighter. 
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In this era of flat and slightly declining budgets it is critical to make acquisition decisions 
that consider the long-term affordability, and therefore, viability of fielded systems. The 
Navy cannot continue to field new ships without correcting this behavior. 
Findings from the GAO reports were very similar. While there are some 
circumstances specific to shipbuilding, they should not prohibit proper sustainment 
planning from being implemented. While shipbuilding is somewhat unique in that there is 
likely no way to avoid having the technology development/maturation and construction be 
done concurrently, the amount of emphasis placed on pre-delivery versus post-delivery is 
disproportionate to the impacts each phase has on the TOC for the life of the ship. The 
GAO data clearly indicates sustainment planning and the influence of TOC on acquisition 
decisions is disconnected, which leads to cost growth not only upon delivery, but also in 
subsequent O&S costs in the out years. The magnitude of such growth warrants 
implementing reforms. Findings regarding how Sustainment requirements are set, how risk 
is accounted for, and how many deficiencies are passed on to the Fleet to correct after 
delivery are all symptoms of the disconnect between acquisition and sustainment. 
Outside of the governance challenge previously highlighted, there are many 
external factors that lead to increased sustainment cost. Primarily, we found that the lack 
of flexibility in reprogramming hinders the ability for portfolio managers to rapidly adjust 
to changing environments. The Navy must appeal to Congress to allow it the increased 
flexibility to address sustainment challenges when they occur, where they occur without 
prior justification to Congress. This does not remove congressional oversight nor increase 
cost but allows more rapid adjustment than the current planning, programming, budgeting, 
and execution (PPBE) process allows. When successful in driving legislative change, the 
Navy must trust and delegate to the lowest level (PEO/PM). This improves efficiency and 
drives down cost by applying funds where they are needed when they are needed within 
the overall authorizations and appropriations made by Congress.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, SUMMARY, 
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
When combined, the findings from the Section 809 panel report and the GAO 
reports are very similar. While the Section 809 panel encompassed recommendations for 
all of DOD, and the GAO focused more on shipbuilding, the conclusions regarding TOC 
trends, needs, and recommendations are strikingly direct. The conflict inherent in the 
acquisition process with respect to sustainment cost planning requires tools, processes, and 
structure that will allow for the better prioritization of TOC and sustainment when PM and 
program offices are making acquisition decisions. 
The sustainment-based recommendations of the Section 809 panel report would 
improve Navy ship sustainment significantly. The greatest impact is with respect to 
governance. A SPB with equal standing to the APB would improve accountability of the 
program manager by implementing a formal decision point that is focused on the 
sustainment of Navy ships as opposed to the current process. The life cycle sustainment 
plan (LCSP) is briefed, as required, to the MDA as part of the acquisition process; however, 
the APB is focused on unit cost and held to caps based on Nunn-McCurdy. While this is 
important, it can lead to a short-term vice long term focus. The sustainment program 
baseline would also help product support managers (PSM) to better integrate the myriad of 
tasks and competing priorities in sustainment. The Navy has adopted the sustainment role; 
however, it is advisory in nature. 
The Section 809 panel report also discussed increased budgetary flexibilities, 
specifically with respect to reprogramming. We find those flexibilities to be critical in 
allowing better efficiency in management of Navy ship portfolios. We recommend that the 
Navy and DOD advocate for this legislative change. This flexibility would allow the Navy 
to apply funds to sustainment challenges directly within program budget without the need 
to specifically request authorization from Congress. It should be noted this has no impact 
to congressional oversight as reprogramming would still be reported to Congress and the 
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legislative branch may, at any point, request additional justification or rationale for, or 
block, the reprogramming of funds. 
Key findings from the GAO reports include the large amount of concurrency in 
technology maturation, design, and construction as well as the lack understanding in how 
decisions early in acquisition affect TOC and lack of processes in place to evaluate TOC. 
The consequences of choosing concurrency, or deciding to delay an improvement, or 
measure “readiness” in a specific manner are so far delayed, and so difficult to trace, that 
the GAO may only evaluate them in aggregate. This further reinforces the conclusion that 
Navy shipbuilding can improve in long-term sustainment planning and cost estimating. 
This further reinforces the conclusion that Navy shipbuilding can improve long-term 
sustainment planning and cost estimating. 
The references studied in this paper bring no surprises, but perhaps some solutions. 
Considering TOC impacts early in the acquisition process, increased awareness and 
accountability for risks taken and realized, better ways to analyze and quantify TOC and 
measure how a ship or class is truly performing for greater accountability will all help move 
us towards a more sustainable Navy. 
B. SUMMARY 
Overall, there is general recognition by the community that acquisition and 
sustainment are challenging to balance. Recent indications from the Section 809 Panel and 
both GAO reports show that a closer look at how acquisition impacts sustainment and TOC 
should be taken. The Section 809 panel and GAO recommendations regarding sustainment 
costs as part of TOC both emphasized a greater need for the latter stages of the life cycle 
to influence the preceding ones. For example, the recommendations from the Section 809 
Panel regarding the SPB with equal standing to the APB and the GAO report findings 
tracing cost growth post-delivery to pre-delivery decisions mark a shift in recent discourses 
across the community to the sustainment part of TOC. Enacting the SPB would also 
provide governance and accountability and regularly establish milestones in the 
sustainment phase. 
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Primary contributing factors to increased sustainment costs include the large 
amount of concurrency in technology development, design, and construction combined 
with lack of emphasis on the impacts to TOC early acquisitions decisions may have down 
the line, and lack of advocacy for TOC considerations early in the acquisition process as 
well. While the factors that have contributed to increasing TOCs for many of the recently 
procured and delivered ships classes have been recognized, reforms such as those 
recommend by the Section 809 Panel are needed to have lasting and impactful change. 
Ships will always need to overlap technology development, design, and construction, but 
understanding of the risks involved and the ability of the acquisition professionals to 
manage TOC early in the process can make a significant difference. The caveat is that the 
tools, processes, and framework need to be in place to support them. Because the Section 
809 Panel findings closely aligned with the GAO reports, many of the recommendations 
would be effective in controlling TOC costs and assisting with TOC management 
throughout the shipbuilding process. 
With regard to external influences, additional budget flexibility is key. For the Navy 
to gain additional flexibility and efficiencies they should advocate for legislative branch 
changes to reprogramming authority. Specifically, the Navy should request Congress grant 
the ability to increase BTR thresholds and allow for reprogramming at all thresholds with 
Congressional notification. This external flexibility will allow the Navy to apply funds 
across Navy ship classes directly to sustainment challenges as they manage Navy ship 
programs as a portfolio.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After review of the Section 809 panel and GAO reports, we recommend that the 
DON modify the current structure to establish an Assistant Secretary for Research and 
Development and a separate Assistant Secretary for Acquisition & Sustainment, as the 
latter demands accountability for both elements and does not imply precedence to 
acquisition alone. Alternatively, the Navy could maintain the current Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition but elevate the sustainment 
position to Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Sustainment. Either option would make 
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sustainment equivalent and not secondary to acquisition. We recommend the former option 
as this drives a single point of accountability for both acquisition and sustainment and has 
the best opportunity to drive program manager accountability for total life cycle costs 
(TLCC). This organizational equivalence is important especially when transitioning from 
the current two-step, seven gate process. The sustainment position should not simply advise 
the acquisition lead with no discrete authority. We also recommend the DON implement 
the SPB as soon as practical to provide biannual portfolio review and decisions regarding 
appropriate sustainment requirements. The combination of these recommendations would 
provide equal decision-making authority with respect to sustainment. Any less will still 
cause sustainment to continue to take a secondary position to acquisition that negatively 
impacts Navy ships over their total life cycle. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition 
Regulations (Section 809 panel, 2019) provides many recommendations that impact 
sustainment of Navy ships. While we examined the main sustainment recommendations 
related to portfolio management and below threshold reprogramming budget 
recommendations, we recommend further research regarding the Section 809 panel budget 
recommendations and their impact on sustainment. 
Additionally, modernization outside of mid-life upgrades is a method of sustaining 
Navy ships over their life cycle. Additional capability aside, an examination of a more 
structured, streamlined, programmatic approach to incremental modernization in 
sustainment could be considered. 
We also suggest research regarding how acquisition incentives such as unit cost 
drive program managers and decision makers to make trade-offs that negatively impact the 
long term to ensure program success over the short-term.  
Finally, while there are many published works such as that of Boudreau and 
Naegle’s paper on TOC that discuss weapons system acquisition in depth, further research 
on the specific ship classes previously investigated by the GAO and even new ones such 
as guided missile frigate (FFG) 62 could be used to build upon the growing body of work 
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related to Navy ships specifically. While many concepts translate well to ships and other 
programs, any nuances involved with Navy shipbuilding and systemic issues and 
paradigms unique to the Navy may lead to new paths as well. 
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